A revision of George Kennedy's translation of, introdution to, and commentary on Aristotle's On Rhetoric. His translation is most accurate, his general introduction is the most thorough and insightful, and his brief introductions to sections of the work, along with his explanatory footnotes, are the most useful available.

1891. The recovered manuscript of Aristotle's Constitutional History of Athens, now for the first time given to the world from the unique text in the British...

Contains the _Poetics _ and the first twelve chapters of the_ Rhetoric_, Book III.

The author argues that an analysis ofthe texts ofthe Collection of Hippocrates leads to the conclusion that long before the methodological genius of Aristotle there existed a highly analytical culture among medical professionals. The differences in understanding of the value and objectives of a valid inference in Hippocrates and Aristotle are explained in terms of the characteristics of the discourse that each of them used. Aristotle is argued to have been using a social-dialectical discourse, whereas, (...) in medical practice, a combination of skills and reasoning had the highest value because what was expected from a doctor was the right diagnosis and the right treatment. The author argues that rational medical tradition of antiquity did not reach the logical reflection. According to her, the doctrine of the necessary connection between the logical attribute and the object of inferences had been developed in the Buddhist logic, which, as the author argues, can be considered a rational component of education in Tibetan medicine. (shrink)

The author argues that an analysis ofthe texts ofthe Collection of Hippocrates leads to the conclusion that long before the methodological genius of Aristotle there existed a highly analytical culture among medical professionals. The differences in understanding of the value and objectives of a valid inference in Hippocrates and Aristotle are explained in terms of the characteristics of the discourse that each of them used. Aristotle is argued to have been using a social-dialectical discourse, whereas, (...) in medical practice, a combination of skills and reasoning had the highest value because what was expected from a doctor was the right diagnosis and the right treatment. The author argues that rational medical tradition of antiquity did not reach the logical reflection. According to her, the doctrine of the necessary connection between the logical attribute and the object of inferences had been developed in the Buddhist logic, which, as the author argues, can be considered a rational component of education in Tibetan medicine. (shrink)

The editors have put together an interesting and important collection of twelve essays that trace the development of explanations of the human body that appeal to machines and other technological artefacts. Although the focus of the book is ancient authors, with the oldest being Homer and Pindar, the last essay reaches into the eighteenth century, at which point there are no longer mere analogies between human bodies and machines but a conception of the human body as something mechanized. The essays (...) are put together in such a way that emphasizes the early-modern conception as the terminus of the ancient mode of inquiry. (shrink)

George Karamanolis breaks new ground in the study of later ancient philosophy by examining the interplay of the two main schools of thought, Platonism and Aristotelianism, from the first century BC to the third century AD. Arguing against prevailing scholarly assumption, he argues that the Platonists turned to Aristotle only in order to elucidate Plato's doctrines and to reconstruct Plato's philosophy, and that they did not hesitate to criticize Aristotle when judging him to be at odds with (...) Plato. Karamanolis offers much food for thought to ancient philosophers and classicists. (shrink)

Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and percep- tion independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for starting with a (...) clear account of ordinary objects rather than immediately reifying mathematical objects. He thus allows us to have a coherent account of existence and truth, and to easily resist collapsing ontology into epistemology. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Aristotle and William of Ockham both argue that existence or being is a predicate, though not a distinguishing predicate. I place Ockham’s argument in an Aristotelian context and discuss its merits. I then turn to empiricist criticisms of the view that we can coherently predicate being of things. I argue that while Ockham’s argument is cogent, his account of how we come to have the concept of being is inadequate. Ockham’s view needs to be supplemented with Kantian insights.

Aristotle argues that provided we have moderate luck, we can attain eudaimonia through our own effort. He claims that it is crucial to attaining eudaimonia that we aim at an overall target in our lives to which all our actions are directed. He also claims that the proper target of a eudaimon human life is virtuous activity, which is a result of effort not chance. He criticises Theognis for saying that the most pleasant thing is to chance on love, (...) arguing instead that virtuous activity is the most pleasant thing. I argue that although Aristotle’s view is insightful and carefully worked out, he fails to show that Theognis is wrong. Effort is not necessarily the path to human eudaimonia and important things we attain by chance seem to have an irreplacable value. (shrink)

Beginning from Aristotle's view that metaphysics is the science of being as being, Couvalis brings together neglected and important arguments in a comprehensive, yet concise exploration of metaphysics. Other figures covered include Heraclitus, Protagoras, Aquinas, Ockham, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Russell.

In Aristotle and Law, George Duke argues that Aristotle's seemingly dispersed statements on law and legislation are unified by a commitment to law's status as an achievement of practical reason. This book provides a systematic exposition of the significance and coherence of Aristotle's account of law, and also indicates the relevance of this account to contemporary legal theory. It will be of great interest to scholars and students in jurisprudence, philosophy, political science and classics.

Any attempt to apply Aristotelian political categories to the principles of modern constitutionalism is undoubtedly at risk of anachronism. This paper acknowledges non-trivial differences between the Ancient Greek politeia, as theorised by Aristotle, and the modern constitution. It nonetheless argues that the central principles of the modern liberal constitution can be elucidated within the explanatory frame of the Aristotelian concept of the politeia as a political determination of institutional structures and competences oriented by an interpretation of the public good. (...) The paper is divided in three sections. Section 1 outlines Aristotle’s account of the politeia. Section 2 considers some central principles of modern constitutionalism. Section 3 then examines these principles under an Aristotelian lens. The conclusion sketches a potential objection, implicit in the paper’s arguments, to a recent proposal for a ‘neo-Aristotelian’ normative constitutional theory. (shrink)

This paper explores the normative implications of Aristotle's concept of politikē and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary debates on legitimate political authority. Section one of the paper provides historical and interpretative background on Aristotle's conception of politikē. The second section examines the central normative role that the common good plays in Aristotle's account of politikē and claims that its capacity to play this role points in the direction of a less exclusionary politics than is suggested by Book (...) 1 of the Politics. Finally, in the third section, with reference to work by Andres Rosler and David Estlund, I consider what Aristotle's account can tell us about contemporary debates on the relationship between political authority, legitimacy and expertise. (shrink)

A correct understanding of experience is crucial for understanding the difference between human and non-human animals. Richard Sorabji interprets Aristotle to be affirming that experience in non-human animals is the same thing as a rudimentary universal, and that the individual who possesses experience achieves his goal by the application of low level univer-sals. I argue that this is neither a correct understanding of Aristotle’s statements in the Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, nor is it true to the (...) facts. Sorabji is misled, first, by the fact that experience can be regarded as a rudimentary universal in humans, and secondly by the fact that people of experience often possess universals that pertain to their actions. As to the latter, I show that people of experience do not succeed in virtue of possessing universals. As to the former, I point out that regarding experience as a rudimentary universal presupposes that the being that possesses them goes on to acquire true universals, something Sorabji fails to show. The presence of a modicum of experience in some non-human animals, thus, does not show that these beings share with us the capacity for knowledge of universals. (shrink)

Some years ago Edward Regis, Jr. pointed to a serious gap in Aristotelian studies: "The centrality of the . . . 'problem of universals' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue for argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status of universals and their relation to individuals, the process of 'concept formation,' and the epistemological function of universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy . . . In view of the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the numerous (...) studies of other topics treated of by Aristotle, it is a matter for at least initial surprise that there exists no systematic account of his views on universals." This essay attempts to fill this gap in Aristotelian studies partially. ;Aristotle's view of the universal went through three phases, and the essay attempts to give a systematic account of his early concept of it, as well as briefer accounts of his middle and late views. His early concept may be defined as 'an existent by nature asserted of several existents'. The essay attempts to explain this concept by explicating the two major terms of its definition, 'an existent' and 'is asserted of'. 'An existent' is explained on the basis of his doctrine of the categories and 'is asserted of' on the basis of some fundamentals of his early theory of the simple statement. His middle view of the universal may be defined as 'an existent which by nature belongs to several existents'. According to his late view, however, the universal is a mere potency, no longer an actually existing thing. ;After its account of Aristotle's three views, the essay reconsiders the commonly-held view that he is a moderate realist, arguing that, although moderate realism can be truly ascribed to him, it gives us neither an accurate nor an adequate statement of the nature of his universal. It concludes by briefly tracing the movement of thought on universals in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of (...) the world. The paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen. (shrink)

Aristotle studies syllogistic argumentation in Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics. In the latter he focuses on the formal and syntactic character of arguments and treats the sullogismoi and non-sullogismoi as argument patterns with valid or invalid instances. In the former Aristotle focuses on semantics and rhetoric to study apparent sullogismoi as object language arguments. Interpreters usually take Sophistical Refutations as considerably less mature than Prior Analytics. Our interpretation holds that the two works are more of a piece than (...) previously believed and, indeed, that Aristotle's treatment of fallacious reasoning presupposes the results of the formal theory. (shrink)

Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and perception independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for starting with a clear (...) account of ordinary objects rather than immediately reifying mathematical objects. He thus allows us to have a coherent account of existence and truth, and to easily resist collapsing ontology into epistemology. (shrink)

We can now recognize Aristotle's many accomplishments in logical theory, not the least of which is treating the deduction process itself as a subject matter and thus establishing the science of logic. Aristotle took logic to be that part of epistemolo gy used to establish knowledge of logical consequence. Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on his syllogistic system in which Aristotle modelled his deduction system to demonstrate certain logical relationships among its rules. Aristotle's n otion (...) of substitution distinguishes logical syntax from semantics and enabled him to distinguish validity from deducibility sufficiently to note the completeness of his logic. (shrink)

Quine has often expressed his impatience with the fact that "Identity evidently invites confusion between sign and object" He finds the confusion in the works of a great many philosophers. What is most interesting, however, is that he excludes Aristotle from his disapprobation. "On the other hand Aristotle had the matter straight: things are identical when 'whatever is predicated of the one should be predicated of the other'. I believe a closer inspection of Aristotle's views would lead (...) Quine to abandon this small truce with the Philosopher--unfortunately for Quine. (shrink)

Aristotle maintains that paideia enables one to judge the method used by a given speaker without judging the conclusions drawn as well. He contends that this "paideia of principles" requires three things: seeing that principles are not derived from one another; seeing that there is nothing before them within reason; and, seeing that they are the source of much knowledge. In order to grasp these principles, one must respectively learn to recognize what distinguishes the subject matters studied in different (...) disciplines, see first principles as coming from experience and acquire the habit of seeking them in one’s experience and, finally, see first principles as being the source of conclusions. While the second and third points might at first seem to pertain to "nous" and science, respectively, rather than to paideia, the case can be made that paideia involves more of a firm grasp of principles than "nous" and a less perfect way of relating conclusion to principles than science. (shrink)

Not until the early 1920’s was it possible to distinguish Aristotelian or traditional logic from Aristotle’s own ancient logic. We can now recognize many aspects of his logical investigations that are themselves modern, in the sense that modern logicians are making discoveries that Aristotle had already made or had anticipated. Here we gather five salient features of Aristotle’s logical investigations that reveal a striking philosophical modernity: 1) Aristotle took logic to be that part of epistemology used (...) to establish knowledge of logical consequence; 2) Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on the syllogistic deduction system; 3) Aristotle recognized the epistemic efficacy of certain elemental argument patterns, and he explicitly formulated them as rules of natural deduction in corresponding sentences; 4) Prior Analytics is a proof-theoretic treatise in which Aristotle describes a natural deduction system and demonstrates certain of the logical relationships among syllogistic deduction rules ; and finally, 5) Aristotle worked with a notion of substitution sufficient for distinguishing logical syntax and semantics. In this connection he also distinguished validity from deducibility sufficiently well to note the completeness of his logic. (shrink)

In an attempt to subject representative texts of a dozen ancient authors to a more or less Socratic inquiry, the noted scholar George Anastaplo suggests in The Thinker as Artist how one might usefully read as well as enjoy such texts, which illustrate the thinking done by the greatest artists and how they "talk" among themselves across the centuries. In doing so, he does not presume to repeat the many fine things said about these and like authors, but rather (...) he discusses what he himself has noticed about them, text by text. Drawing upon a series of classical authors ranging from Homer and Sappho to Plato and Aristotle, Anastaplo examines issues relating to chance, art, nature, and divinity present in the artful works of philosophers and other thinkers. As he has done in his earlier work, Anastaplo mines the great texts to help us discover who we are and what we should be. Some of the works used are familiar, while others were once better known than they are now. The approach to all of them is fresh and provocative, demonstrating the value of such texts in showing the reader what to look for and how to talk about matters that have always engaged thoughtful human beings. These imaginative yet disciplined discussions of important texts of ancient Greek thought and of Raphael's The School of Athens should appeal to both the specialist and the general reader. (shrink)